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a b s t r a c t
In recent years, cooperative management systems have received attention as a means towards
sustainable ﬁsheries. Since its inception and for the past 20 years, the gooseneck barnacle ﬁshery in
the coast of Asturias has been co-managed by assigning Territorial User Rights to ﬁshers' associations,
allowing ﬁshers to participate actively in the management and data gathering processes. Here, 20 years
of landings, in-depth interviews and focus groups were used to characterize the emergence and social-
ecological properties of the system. The system consists of 7 management areas each one some tens of
kilometers long. The incorporation of ﬁshers' knowledge has successfully led to within-area fragmenta-
tion of the management units down to single rocks as small as 3 m long, which are managed according
to different protection levels. The system has empowered resource users and provided an opportunity
for the use of both scientiﬁc information and ﬁshers' knowledge to be integrated in management
guidelines. Results suggest the adaptive capacity provided by the co-management framework has been
essential to manage this heterogeneous ﬁshery. The gooseneck barnacle ﬁshery and its historical
developments illustrate the potential for establishing co-management systems for small-scale ﬁsheries
in Europe.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Fisheries worldwide are currently experiencing a paradigm
shift from a top-down approach towards more bottom-up, com-
munity based efforts [1,2]. This requires changes in regulatory
frameworks in order to address the underlying social, economic
and cultural systems [3]. As part of this paradigm shift, co-
management has been proposed as a promising strategy to
achieve sustainable ﬁsheries since it has the potential to
strengthen community integration [4], enhance ﬁshing stocks
[5], empower resource users [6], adapt to changing conditions
[7] and incorporate both ﬁsher's knowledge and scientiﬁc infor-
mation in management strategies [8].
Co-management consists in the cooperation of governments
and users in the exercise of resource management [9], where both
parties share authority and responsibility [10]. Co-management
systems vary according to the extent of authority delegated to
each party, ranging from instructive, where the decision-making
process is centralized and the resource users are instructed on the
decisions, to informative, where decisions are made locally and
the government agencies are informed [11]. Cooperative systems
aim to create a situation in which the rewards for cooperation
are greater than those for competition [12], thus avoiding the
tragedy of the commons [13]. Furthermore, a key component in
co-management systems is their inherent adaptive capacity. The
concept of adaptive management was ﬁrst proposed by Holling
[14], it refers to a dynamic management process where policies
are continuously improved according to updated information
about the state of the system [15]. Recently, many successful case
studies on co-management implementation have been documen-
ted [1,8,16], most of which are located in developing nations.
Paradoxically, research shows that co-management has higher
probability of success in areas with a high Human Development
Index (HDI) [2].
European ﬁsheries have faced increasing pressure for the past
50 years causing a depletion of stocks [17,18]. Fisheries manage-
ment in Europe has focused on a top-down approach [19], where
management strategies are a matter of international policy [20].
Several strategies have been employed to ensure the sustainability




0308-597X/& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
n Corresponding author at: Departamento de Biología de Organismos y Sistemas,
Universidad de Oviedo. Calle Catedrático Rodrigo Uría, s/n, 33071 Oviedo, Spain.
Tel.: þ34 985 10 62 61; fax: þ34 985 10 48 66
Marine Policy 50 (2014) 300–308
of ﬁshing stocks in the European Union, such as the Common
Fishery Policy (CFP). The CFP aims to guarantee sustainable ﬁsh
stocks and the economic welfare of ﬁshing communities. How-
ever, according to the Green Paper for the reform of the CFP, as of
2009, 88% of ﬁshing stocks were being overexploited and sus-
tainable management had not been achieved [21]. The lack of
success of the CFP has been attributed to a number of caveats in
its framework and implementation. Highlighted among these
caveats are, the lack of approval by the public [22], the imple-
mentation of an open access policy and numerous subsidies
which promote the race for ﬁsh [17] and a framework that deters
the incorporation of scientiﬁc knowledge [23]. Furthermore, an
important criticism to European policy is its focus on industrial
and large scale ﬂeets which leads to the neglect of the small-scale
artisanal ﬁshery sector [24], these small-scale ﬁsheries comprise
an important proportion of the European ﬂeet [25] and are
essential in maintaining coastal communities [26]. Most of these
downfalls come from the CFPs inherent top-down approach.
The EU has acknowledged the need for a regionalization of the
CFP, where a greater involvement of stakeholders should be
encouraged [21]. The application of collaborative policies, such
as co-management, could potentially improve EU ﬁshery policy.
The gooseneck barnacle (Pollicipes pollicipes) ﬁshery in the
Asturian coast (North Spain) is currently an important component
of the artisanal ﬂeet in this area [27]. In 1994, a co-management
system was implemented in the Asturian gooseneck barnacle
ﬁshery, which continues to date. According to informal observa-
tions, co-management has enabled the sustainability of the
system. However, an in-depth study of the system has not been
attempted. Here, the implementation and development of this co-
management system are explored. Co-management has allowed
for an adaptive learning-based approach and a ﬁne-scale manage-
ment of the ﬁshery (down to 3 m; Fig. 1), thereby endorsing
the match of social, biological and management scales. Thus,
the co-management system aids in the sustainability of the
gooseneck barnacle ﬁshery. The illustration of the Asturian goose-
neck barnacle system provides insights about the potential for co-
management implementation and its prospects as a management
approach in a broader European context.
2. Methods
2.1. Study area and settings
The Asturian co-management system is located between the Eo
estuary (29T 666839 4827388 UTM) and the eastern most part of
Cape Peñas (29T 667714 4827400 UTM). It is divided in 7 regions
with distinct management, denominated management plans for
their Spanish name, which depend on the regional government
(Principado de Asturias) and the local ﬁshers' associations known
as cofradías (Fig. 1). Currently, the Tapia-Figueras, Viavélez, Orti-
guera, Puerto de Vega, Luarca, Cudillero-Oviñana plans are seasonal
with a harvest season that starts in October and ends in April, and
a total individual daily allowable catch (TAC) per ﬁsher that varies
between 6 and 8 kg. However, the Cabo Peñas plan, which
comprises the Luanco-Bañugues cofradías, allows harvesting all
year with a constant daily TAC of 8 kg per ﬁsher.
2.2. Characterization of the system
The distribution and dimension of the Asturian gooseneck barnacle
co-management plans was characterized using the Principado de
Asturias Coastal and Marine Geographic Information System. Each co-
management plan is subdivided into management zones, which can
be separate rocks, groups of rocks, or small coastal strips. Furthermore,
information on the commercial quality of each zone was gathered
from the Dirección General de Pesca Marítima del Principado de Asturias
(DGPM) ofﬁcial records. The quality of each zone was determined at
the inception of the co-management plans by incorporating ﬁshers'
knowledge and was further corroborated by in situ inspections by
personnel from the DGPM and SIGMA S.L. in 2006 and 2008 [28].
To explore the seasonality of the co-management system daily
records for landings in 233 ﬁshing zones within 6 plans were
analyzed for the 1994–1995 to 2010–2011 ﬁshing seasons. The
Luarca plan was excluded due to gaps in the datasets. One-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to test for differences
in landings among months.
Information on the yearly management of the ﬁshing zones
was obtained through the Boletín Oﬁcial del Principado de Asturias.
The type of ban applied to each zone for the 2000–2001 to 2010–
2011 ﬁshing campaigns was recorded. These were divided in
3 categories: total, partial or no ban. Linear regression analysis
was used to test the effect of bans on next year's landings.
Landings were standardized [29] by zone to make comparisons
among zones. All linear regression assumptions were tested.
Fig. 1. (A) Location of the study area. (B) Map of Asturian coast showing the seven
co-management plans. (C) Fine-scale map of the Tapia-Figueras plan. (D) Castelois,
Salgueriza, Trabe and Cabo Cebes exploitation zones in the Tapia-Figueras plan.
Castelois represents an area of regular quality which receives a no-ban manage-
ment; Salgueriza is a good quality area which is managed by partial ban; Trabe is a
bad quality area which also receives a no-ban treatment and Cabo Cebes is a good
quality area managed by implementing total bans.
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2.3. Description of the market
Gooseneck barnacles sales were analyzed to detect a potential
effect of the co-management system. Data on all sales carried out
in the 17 major ﬁsh markets within Asturian territory from January
1st 2001 to December 31st 2011 were examined. The effect of a
seasonal component or the known market cycles (high, mid and
low) on the mean daily price/kg was determined by one-way
ANOVAs. The high market period for gooseneck barnacles occurs
during the month of December, mid sales period includes October,
November and January–April and the low season goes fromMay to
September.
2.4. Fishers' knowledge and perceptions
Individual semi-structured interviews were carried out with goose-
neck barnacle ﬁshers, government ofﬁcials and key members of the
cofradías (n¼12) as a way to understand the general perception of the
co-management system and its implementation. With the information
obtained from the interviews, focus groups were performed in the 7
co-management plans from October to December 2012. Focus group
sizes were around 5 persons and aimed to assess ﬁshers' participation
in the management system, adaptability of the system and the way
ﬁshers' knowledge and scientiﬁc information were incorporated. In
each focus group there was at least one representative of the resource
users and one of the government ofﬁcials.
3. Results
3.1. Description and history of implementation
Before the early 1990s gooseneck barnacles in Asturias were
only harvested sporadically by a few ﬁshers. In 1994, the Asturian
government through the Dirección General de Pesca Marítima del
Principado de Asturias (DGPM) saw the opportunity to exploit this
previously under-marketed resource in the area. They approached
a number of cofradías with a proposal for a pilot gooseneck
barnacle exploitation program. The program consisted in colla-
borative management of the resource between DGPM and the
cofradía. The pilot program was carried out in the Ortiguera
cofradía that same year (Fig. 1). By 2001 seven co-management
plans between DGPM and 10 cofradías had been established in the
Asturian coast, making it one of the ﬁrst examples of a ﬁshery
managed since its early stages and without an important crisis
driving its reform.
The system consists of assigning exclusive Territorial User
Rights for Fishing (TURFs) to each management plan. Under the
TURF arrangement, only licensed members of the plan are allowed
to exploit their assigned territory, in return for detailed data
gathering by the cofradías (Fig. 2). The cofradías report daily
landings and effort data for each ﬁsher and zone in the plan,
providing an important source of up to date information. At the
beginnings of the co-management system the cofradías were
actively involved in the distribution, selection and classiﬁcation
of extraction zones. Currently, there is a constant participation of
the cofradías in the management, surveillance and commercializa-
tion of the resource. Once the cofradías and DGPM have agreed on
the guidelines for the ﬁshing season these are published in the
Boletin Oﬁcial del Principado de Asturias, the ofﬁcial newsletter
responsible for publishing new legislation.
3.2. Resource management
The co-management system has enabled the subdivision of
the plans into detailed management units, denominated as zones,
which span from single rocks 3 m long up to 3.3 km extents of
coastline. The system encompasses a total of 267 zones in
approximately 200 km of the Asturian coastline and surrounding
Fig. 2. Description of the Asturian gooseneck barnacle co-management system. Image of the resource (A), ﬁshers harvesting the resource (B), landings weight-in (C),
separation of the resource by commercial quality (D) and the Cabo Peñas cofradía, where ﬁrst sale auctions take place (E). In (D), a cooperative management approach, where
ﬁshers share the harvest, is observed.
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islands. Moreover, each zone has been classiﬁed according to the
commercial quality of gooseneck barnacles it renders (Table 1).
The spatial detail of management exhibited in this ﬁshery can
only be obtained through a co-management system, were all
the resources users aid in the collection of data. Maintaining such
an exhaustive database would be impossible in an open-access
regime, due to the high enforcement costs and lack of workforce.
The management of the ﬁshing zones is also handled at a
small-scale, by establishing bans at the beginning of the campaign
through legal closures. These can either be total bans, closed for
the entire ﬁshing season, or partial bans where rocks are only
opened for a few months, generally during the high season. These
bans are distributed heterogeneously across the co-management
plan with a large number of partial bans in all plans and a few,
alternating total bans in 5 plans (Fig. 3). Partial bans are set to
reserve zones for when the market demand is at its peak and the
greatest proﬁt will be gained. Total bans are generally applied to
good quality zones to maximize proﬁts for the next year and
prevent overexploitation. The bans are initially proposed by the
DGPM after a general inspection of the zones during the summer.
However, these are not established until they have been approved
by the cofradías, demonstrating a clear example of continuous
collaboration between the government and the stakeholders,
intrinsic to a co-management system. According to the ﬁshers
who participated in focus groups, bans are essential in sustaining
the resource hence their active participation in the selection
process. Furthermore, the positive effect of the bans can be corro-
borated in the relationship between the bans for the previous year
and standardized landings; ﬁshing zones with a total ban will have
greater landings than those with partial or no ban (Fig. 3). An
increase of 0.51 standard deviations over the mean is expected in
zones a year after a total ban (linear regression; po0.0001). Thus,
the collaborative and detailed process of establishing a particular
ban in each zone driven by co-management has aided in the
sustainability of the gooseneck barnacle ﬁshery.
3.3. The market
The effect of the co-management system reaches beyond the
extraction of the resource and also impacts the market. Currently
gooseneck barnacles are viewed as a luxury item in Spain and
Portugal with ﬁrst sale market values reaching 266 euros/kg in
Asturian markets. Moreover, the quality of the resource, which has
been determined for each zone, also translates into economic
proﬁt. The commercial quality of gooseneck barnacles depends on
the relationship between the length, width and weight of the
barnacle [30]; ﬁshers select barnacles with greater amount of
muscle in their peduncle (proportion of edible area).
An average difference on daily price per kilogram of 51.9570.83
(mean7standard error) euros in ﬁrst sale Asturian markets
was observed. However, this difference can vary up to 259 euros
depending on the season. A strong monthly and seasonal compo-
nent was identiﬁed in gooseneck barnacle sales (ANOVA; both
po0.0001), which coincides with the monthly seasonality present
in landings (ANOVA; po0.0001) determined by the ﬁshing
campaign (Fig. 4). The Christmas holiday period (December)
can be considered the high season for gooseneck barnacle sales,
where the mean sales price is 4370.19 euros/kg. For the remain-
ing months of the seasonal ﬁshing campaign (November and
January–April) the mean price is 25.9770.07 euros/kg and
17.9470.12 euros/kg from May to September (Fig. 4). As is
expected, the greatest mean monthly landings occur during the
high season (December) (Fig. 4), where there is greater demand.
There is also a peak in mean landings at the beginning of the
campaign (October), which is not observable in the mean sale
price. The annual exploitation cycle and market prices are likely
inﬂuenced by the availability of ﬁshing grounds, determined by
legal bans and ﬁshing seasons established through collaborative
management, as well as market demand. Thus, the co-manage-
ment system is exerting an effect upon market prices.
3.4. The resource users
Considering the ﬁne-scale and heterogeneous management of
the plans, it is important to assess the role of the ﬁshers. Fishing
licenses are allotted to each co-management plan proportionally
to the percentage of exploitable area within the plan (Table 1).
Of these quotas 75% must belong to the local cofradía and the other
Table 1
Asturian gooseneck barnacle co-management system general information.
All plans Tapia-Figueras Viavélez Ortiguera Puerto Vega Luarca Cudillero-Oviñana Cabo Peñas
Extension [km] E184.4 30.6 16.6 16.6 16.5 36.6 45.5 22
Total zones 267 28 20 28 46 34 70 41
Good quality zones [%] 47.6 53.6 40 28.6 26.1 58.8 30 65.9
Regular quality zones [%] 36.7 35.7 25 28.6 52.2 35.3 38.6 29.3
Bad quality zones [%] 21.7 10.7 35 42.8 21.7 5.9 31.4 4.9
Mean landings [kg/year] E45,104 9415.1 3602.2 5300.5 5580.5 – 14946.7 11432.7
Fishers in the 2013–2014 ﬁshing season 189 27 11 13 18 23 55 42
Fig. 3. Map showing standardized yearly landings for the 2008–2011 ﬁshing
seasons and bans for the previous year. Black dots represent total bans, gray partial
bans and white no ban.
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25% is ﬁlled by members of other cofradías. By leaving a 25% non-
local quota the DGPM gives an opportunity to ﬁshers from
cofradías without co-management systems who are eager to join
the plans. There is high foreign and local demand to join the co-
management plans; all plans have a waiting list to issue new
licenses. In the interviews, stakeholders stated global and local
measures had to be taken to control ﬁshing effort. This concurs
with the measures adopted by the DGPM; ﬁshers must have
completed 20 days at sea in the previous campaign and be active
members of an Asturian cofradía to renew their license. The
cofradías have also established their own criteria in accepting
new ﬁshers, the Cabo Peñas plan members unanimously decided to
only allow one new member for every three that leave the plan
and others set a moratorium on issuing new licenses until they
reach their target size. According to the focus groups, the ﬁshers
perceive their opinion on management guidelines is valued and
enforced. The joint approach to control ﬁshing effort in Asturias
can only be possible through a co-management system. Moreover,
this approach also aids in including the ﬁshers in the management
process and generates a sense of empowerment.
One of the main concerns expressed by ﬁshers during the
focus groups was the presence of poachers who exploit their
TURFs, particularly during the closed season or in banned areas.
The DGPM ﬁnances one surveillance ofﬁcer per management plan
who works a daily shift. Due to the surveillance effort several
poaching cases have been documented and sanctioned by local
authorities. However, according to the resource users many cases
go unpunished or receive relatively small ﬁnes. Fishers expressed a
sense of entitlement, characteristic to exclusive rights systems,
and saw an imminent need to protect their resource. Thus, in
Cudillero-Oviñana, Luarca and Puerto de Vega all members have
agreed to personally carry out a few days of surveillance in special
interest areas.
In the interviews and focus groups multiple resource users
expressed concern to the constraints in compatibility between
target species. The gooseneck barnacle ﬁshery is legally compa-
tible with shellﬁsh pot, eel ﬁshing sieve and hook and line ﬁshing.
However, compatible gears can vary among plans. Nonetheless, to
exploit incompatible resources, those that require passive-ﬁshing
gears such as gillnets and trammelnets, the ﬁshers must resign
their license for the rest of the ﬁshing campaign. During the focus
groups ﬁshers that belong to a professional ﬁshing vessel con-
veyed the most apprehension towards these measures, they
generally only work for the ﬁrst half of the campaign (October–
December) and then depart to other ﬁsheries. This generates a
partition of gooseneck barnacle ﬁshers into two groups, profes-
sional ﬁshers and autonomous ﬁshers who do not belong to a
professional vessel and only have an individual license, with
different exploitation seasonality. The autonomous group exploits
gooseneck barnacles exclusively, working throughout the entire
campaign and in some cases combining it with work on land. They
extract fewer kilograms per day than those who work on boats but
work for a longer period. The professionals' strategy is extracting as
much as possible during the high season to get the most beneﬁt.
The divergence in gooseneck barnacle ﬁshing strategies causes
competing interests among the groups, which were put forth in
the focus groups. The professionals seek a shorter ﬁshing season
that adapts to their needs, no more than 3 months. On the
Fig. 4. Monthly trends for mean price (2001–2011) and mean landings (1994–2011) in the seasonal plans (Tapia-Figueras, Viavélez, Ortiguera, Puerto Vega, Luarca and
Cudillero-Oviñana) and the yearly plan (Cabo Peñas). Bars represent the standard error.
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contrary, the autonomous group is interested in year-round
exploitation. In these circumstances it is up the government
agency to mediate terms that will be beneﬁcial for both parties,
such as a 7-month campaign. The co-management system is ideal
in these situations, since in a community management system
these disagreements would be hard to mediate without an
objective external agent and in an exclusively government man-
aged system the implications of the disagreements would not be
fully understood.
3.5. Adaptive capacity
Co-management systems allow for the incorporation of adap-
tive management into the guidelines. In the gooseneck barnacle
ﬁshery, which displays a high level of heterogeneity in the
resource (Table 1; Figs. 1 and 3) and in resource users (see
preceding section), stakeholders agree that the ﬂexibility of the
system has been key in its performance. Constant modiﬁcations
have been done throughout the 20-year history of the plan
(Table 2). One example is the length of the ﬁshing season. It is
discussed before each campaign and will only be modiﬁed if there
is a unanimous consensus in the entire plan and the DGPM. For
example, during the Prestige oil spill the Cudillero-Oviñana and
Cabo Peñas plans had an early closure of the ﬁshing season to avoid
any possible contamination in the resource. There have also been a
couple of successful attempts to close the ﬁshing season a few
months ahead of time in certain cofradías (Table 2).
The ﬁne-scale in which the plan is organized has been ideal for
the implementation of its adaptive management regime. Fishers'
knowledge has led to a detailed fragmentation of the management
units (Section 3.2) unique to collaborative systems, which coin-
cides with the small-scale dispersal (tens of km) of gooseneck
barnacle larvae in the Cantabrian Sea [31]. Before each campaign
the cofradías and the DPGM determine where a ﬁshing closure
would be beneﬁcial, with a level of detail down to 3 m (Table 2).
The decision on what ban to apply to each zone depends on the
status of the rock during the past campaign, information that
relies mainly on ﬁshers' knowledge. The different management
strategies for each zone require continuous and adaptive manage-
ment as well as detailed up to date information on each zone. This
can be observed in Fig. 5 where the trends for 3 different zones are
represented, these are Cabo Cebes, Maste and Picones. The areas
vary in size and location; nonetheless, they are all found in the
Tapia-Figueras plan and are categorized as good quality zones.
A different management strategy has been taken for each rock
either alternating total bans with no ban (Cabo Cebes), partial bans
(Maste) or no bans (Picones). All three zones exhibit positive trends
however this is more pronounced in the alternating total ban
strategy. Still, it is important to take into account that due to the
total bans few data points are available for the Cabo Cebes zone. To
ensure the ﬂexibility of the plan, the ﬁshers hold emergency
meetings throughout the ﬁshing season to determine the status
of the plan and the measures necessary to sustain the resource
(Table 2). Thus, the incorporation of the community in the
management process empowered the resource users, by providing
Table 2
Adaptive capacity characteristics of the Asturian gooseneck barnacle co-management system.
Characteristic Examples
Versatile effort management Fishing season length varies among plans.
Fishing season length may vary yearly.
Daily TAC adjusted between plans.
Daily TAC adjusted in the 2004–2005 ﬁshing season.
Compatible ﬁsheries vary among plans.
Conditions for license bestowal depend on the cofradía.
Conditions for license renewal.
Flexible management of bans Yearly determination of bans for each zone.
Regular meetings to determine condition of zones.
Emergency closures to prevent overexploitation.
Incorporation of life history traits Fishing season adapted to species' reproductive cycle.
Daily TAC adapted to species' settlement strategy.
Matching biological, social and management scales Fine-scale distribution of the resource based on ﬁshers' knowledge.
Management scale adapted to resource dispersal range.
Management adapted to the social context of each plan.
Fig. 5. Seasonal landings in 3 good quality zones of the Tapia-Figueras plan. Total, partial and no bans are represented by squares, triangles and circles, respectively. Trend
lines (solid line) and standard errors (dotted line) are shown for each zone.
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them with a key role in the decision-making process as was
expressed during the focus groups, and endorsed the integration
of ﬁshers' knowledge in the guidelines.
Furthermore, the adaptability of a co-management plan per-
mitted the careful incorporation of gooseneck barnacle life history
traits into the guidelines and the development of innovations
within the plans (Table 2). Before the establishment of the co-
management system research on the distribution and life history
traits of the resource was carried out to determine its exploitation
potential [32], it is complemented each year by follow-up research
performed by the DGPM. Careful attention is placed to protect
juveniles in the co-management system by setting a minimum
harvest size of 4 cm. Nonetheless, according to ﬁshers' knowledge
and scientiﬁc information P. pollicipes larvae usually settle on
the adults [33], thus by-catch is unavoidable. The system adapted
by allowing a few individuals below size as long as they do not
surpass a 10% of the landings. Another important trait is
P. pollicipes reproduction occurring asynchronously during the
summer, from April to September [34,35]. Once the government
ofﬁcials obtained this information, a ﬁshing season from October
to April (both inclusive) was proposed to allow juveniles to settle
during the summer. After negotiation all the cofradías agreed to
the ﬁshing season. However, according to the Cabo Peñas stake-
holders in the focus group and interviews, the seven-month
ﬁshing campaign was no longer suitable to the needs of the plan.
Consequently, since the 2004–2005 season Cabo Peñas exploits
one third of their area during the summer.
Another example of the co-management system's capacity to
adapt to changes is the change in daily TAC implemented in the
2004–2005 campaign (Table 2). Due to decreased landings
observed by the DGPM and the cofradías, daily TAC was reduced
from 8 to 6 kg for most of the campaign with the exception of the
high season (December), where it would remain at 8 kg. However,
the Cabo Peñas cofradía petitioned to maintain the 8 kg TAC, it was
agreed that they would harvest 8 kg during pre-established dates
determined at the beginning of the season.
4. Discussion
The Asturian gooseneck barnacle co-management system pro-
vides an interesting example of the establishment of collaborative
management in small-scale European ﬁsheries. The implementa-
tion of TURFs in Asturias, much like in other areas, brought with it
a series of positive cascading effects [5]. Among the most evident
effects is the incorporation of ﬁshers' knowledge in management
guidelines, the empowerment of stakeholders by making them
active participants in the decision making process, a matching of
scales between resource dynamics and management, an effect
over market forces, improved scientiﬁc information on the
resource and an increase in adaptive capacity of the system. These
characteristics of co-management systems demonstrate its poten-
tial to be incorporated in the great variety of small-scale ﬁsheries
encompassed in the wider European context.
4.1. Fine-scale management
The Asturian co-management system is unique, in that its
clearly deﬁned management units reach a highly detailed scale.
These types of units have been endorsed as a determinant factor in
the success of co-management systems [2,8]. In the Asturian co-
management system the users and the resource are well-deﬁned,
creating an optimal situation for ﬁshers to develop a sense of
entitlement. Furthermore, the ﬁne-scale provides an added bonus
to scientiﬁc research in the area. The effective and continuous
incorporation of local and scientiﬁc knowledge in a management
system is a key driver for its success [16,36] and the lack thereof an
element for its failure [23]. The yearly follow-up research per-
formed by the DGPM acts as a reference for the development of
management guidelines, contributing to the sustainability of the
system. Additionally, the spatially explicit information on ﬁshing
stock, quality and conservation status gathered by the cofradías
has vast research potential.
4.2. Fishers' knowledge and empowerment
The incorporation of the ﬁne-scale management system was
a consequence of the implementation of ﬁshers' knowledge.
The cofradías and its members were responsible for subdividing
the plans into zones, according to the zones historical distribution.
Furthermore, they characterized each zone by the quality of
gooseneck barnacles it yields. The application of ﬁshers' knowl-
edge in the ﬁshery reinforced the generation of new knowledge in
the community by allowing users to become more acquainted
with the resource. Currently, ﬁshers recognize each zone by name
and monitor its status along ﬁshing seasons providing them with
new knowledge. This positive feedback mechanism and progres-
sive accumulation of knowledge have been identiﬁed as key
factors to successful adaptation in management systems [37].
Moreover, acknowledging the ﬁshers' knowledge empowers the
resource users, producing greater involvement and acceptance of
the management system [38,39]. In the gooseneck barnacle co-
management system, ﬁshers' knowledge has been considered
since its beginnings and currently there is great involvement of
the cofradías in all management aspects. An example of this is the
reaction of ﬁshers towards poachers. Management and protection
of the resource are viewed as a personal interest by the ﬁshers,
thus generating a sense of empowerment. Hence, the ﬁshers are
invested in the resource and do not hesitate in implementing their
own surveillance. The same phenomenon occurred in the loco
ﬁshery in Chile [8], where it reduced costs and allowed for a more
effective control. These events demonstrate how the implementa-
tion of the co-management system has aided in creating social
capital, which is essential to the success of any ﬁshery [4,40].
4.3. Co-management as a driver for market forces
The co-management system exerted an effect in markets when
it ﬁrst started commercializing barnacles and it still continues to
drive market cycles. Gooseneck barnacles in Asturias have evolved
since the establishment of the system from being an under-
commercialized resource to reaching prices of over 200 euros/kg
in Asturian markets. Through the establishment of a co-manage-
ment system with spatial property rights the ﬁshery managed to
avoid the tragedy of the commons [13] found in open access
markets, the common system in European ﬁsheries, by incentiviz-
ing the exploitation and stewardship of a pristine resource.
The ﬁshing season was established based on ﬁshers' knowledge
and scientiﬁc information available, particularly P. pollicipes repro-
ductive cycle. Moreover, the ﬁshing season and market cycles have
mutually affected each other. A relationship between supply and
demand was observed and has been incorporated into the guide-
lines by maintaining ﬁshers' daily TAC in 8 kg during the peak
market season (December). Despite these measures there is not
enough supply to meet the increased demands of the season
resulting in a pronounced mean price increase. For the rest of the
campaign supply and demand are balanced and prices stabilize.
During the summer period, only the Cabo Peñas plan remains
open, while market prices decline with regard to those in the high
or mid seasons.
Another characteristic of the system that drives market forces
is the establishment of bans. Good quality zones with higher
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commercial value are submitted to partial bans and are only harvested
during the high season. This strategy ensures that the best resource
will be sold at the highest price thus raising market prices. An effect of
ﬁshers short-term decisions on market demands has been documen-
ted in other small-scale ﬁsheries [5,41]. According to Gutiérrez et al.
[2], in the most accomplished co-management systems the market is
inﬂuenced by the ﬁshers, as is the case in Asturias.
4.4. Adaptive management
Adaptive management has been broadly accepted as a desirable
condition for natural resource management systems [39], it
enhances the resilience of managed natural resources by account-
ing for their unpredictability [39]. The Asturian co-management
system is continuously renewing its management guidelines
through careful assessment, whether it is through ﬁshers' knowl-
edge or scientiﬁc information. Bans are adapted to the distribution
and the particular spatial dynamics of each zone. The ﬂexible
management of bans, particularly total bans, has been effective
controlling landings. Much like in agricultural systems were lands
are left fallow to improve productivity, in the gooseneck barnacle
ﬁshery high quality areas are left unharvested for a year (total ban)
to improve next years' landings. Additionally, if reductions in
landings are perceived immediate measures are taken, the affected
zones are banned for the rest of the season. In the case of
the gooseneck barnacle ﬁshery, when a continuous reduction in
global catches was determined by the DGPM and perceived by
the ﬁshers, a reduction in daily TAC was implemented. According
to stakeholders of the seasonal management plans, adaptive
management has enabled the sustainability of the plans and
produced an increase in yield.
Within the Asturian co-management system important differ-
ences among management plans exist. Particularly the Cabo Peñas
plan, which has developed different harvesting strategies and
guidelines than other plans. However, these measures are not
always beneﬁcial. For example, harvesting zones during the
reproductive period of a species that settles on conspeciﬁcs [33]
might be detrimental to the stock. In a top-down system it would
have been very difﬁcult to ﬁnd a solution however in a ﬂexible
collaborative system, such as the gooseneck barnacle co-manage-
ment, compromises were found. The campaign was adapted for
the Cabo Peñas plan, its territory was divided into three sub-areas;
two are exploited during the ﬁshing season and one during
summer months. This way the ﬁshers are still able to harvest all
year without affecting recruitment for the entire plan. Also, excess
in effort due to greater TAC and a longer campaign in Cabo Peñas
could lead to reduced prices [5] and overexploitation of the
population [42]. However, in the Asturian co-management system
the excess in landings was accounted for by reducing Cabo Peñas´
effort to speciﬁc days. As in other collaborative systems, the
downfalls in the gooseneck barnacle management were mitigated
through cooperation among stakeholders [43]. Interviews and
focus groups shed light on the different social context and
perceptions of the cofradías, particularly Cabo Peñas. Thus, any
ﬁshery management strategy that encompasses all cofradías must
have the adaptive capacity present in co-management systems.
4.5. Implementation of co-management
When the co-management systemwas ﬁrst proposed there was
no particular critical juncture motivating the ﬁshers towards a
change in policy, differing from most cases where collaborative
management has been implemented [3]. On the contrary, the
emergence of co-management was triggered exclusively through
the foreseen beneﬁts of having exclusive rights to market an
unexploited resource. The success of the pilot program generated
a domino effect throughout the western Asturias coast, demon-
strating the inﬂuence of spatial dynamics on a social system. Such
interdependencies in ﬁsheries management have been previously
documented [4], although, it is usually focused on the downfalls
and not the advantages this might represent in a social system.
The Asturian gooseneck barnacle co-management case reveals that
windows of opportunity can be created when the actors involved
feel invested in the new management scheme and both parties
work towards a common goal, in this case making P. pollicipes a
marketable and sustainable resource.
4.6. Co-management and Europe
Three main advantages of co-management documented in the
literature and present in the gooseneck barnacle case study could
be of relevance for European Union policies. First, the building of
social capital and empowerment of ﬁshers, which incentivizes the
preservation of stocks and promotes collaboration among stake-
holders [40]. Second, co-management has enabled the incorpora-
tion of both scientiﬁc and ﬁshers' knowledge, making management
guidelines more robust [8,44]. Finally, decentralized management
with a focus on adaptive capacity has allowed to confront ongoing
challenges posed by these complex social-ecological systems [7].
If co-management is to become a gateway to sustainable ﬁsheries in
Europe, there is an urgent need to create learning platforms where
government, local stakeholders and researchers can co-construct
knowledge and innovate upon the opportunities of engaging in
multi-scale collaborative natural resource management.
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